Saturday, July 31, 2010
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Shliam critique: Second Bone of Contention: the Arab Israeli Military Balance Part 3
As already explained the British used the Jordanian government and its armed wing the Jordanian Legion as a proxy to exercise its interests in the coming regional shift of power in 1948. The case with the British in Egypt was even more damning. When the British left Egypt they left intact a supply of heavy and light weaponry along with training advisors to teach the Egyptian army how to use them. This tilted the balance of power severely in the direction of the Arab states during the war of 1948. [1] Egypt alone, if properly trained and with a well disciplined army could have defeated the Jews without the help of any other Arab army. The problem for the Arab states was not Israeli military dominance as historically argued. In the remaining months of 1947 until July 1948, and the end of the first truce, the Jews were severely handicapped and in a serious weakened position militarily. It was Arab incompetence that won the war for Israel not, Israeli superiority. By all customary military standards Israel should have lost the war in those first few weeks, absolutely no later than June 1.
There is the incident of Israel shooting down five British fighters at the beginning of 1949. On January 1, 1949, Egyptian war ships appeared off the coast of Tel Aviv, and fired on the city. On January 2, 1949 an enemy plane, presumably Egyptian dropped three bombs over Jewish Jerusalem. As a result Jewish forces launched a retaliatory raid on El Arish which was the Egyptian staging point for all military operations inside Palestine. The British used the incursion into the Sinai as a pretext to invoke a 1936 agreement in which they were obligated to defend Egypt in case of invasion. Ben Gurion was warned by the British and promptly ordered all Jewish forces removed back behind Israeli lines. By January 3, 1949, all Israeli forces had been removed from Egyptian soil [2] On January 7, Israel shot down five British flown spitfires, killing at least one pilot and taking another prisoner because their aircraft crashed inside Israeli lines. [3]
I agree with Shlaim’s analysis of the Jewish side that he offers in this section.
It would be hard not to acknowledge the above truisms about the ’48 war since these are all established facts but, Shlaim sticks one sentence in this paragraph almost as if he were trying to sneak it in. Right after the ellipses of the above quote, Shlaim says “ Nevertheless, the Yishuv was not as hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned as the official history would have us believe.” I would argue this as hyperbole.
Military generals always think in terms of the other side’s strengths and weaknesses. It is not for them to speculate on how the enemy might utilize those strengths and weaknesses only that they possess the potential for using it. In assessing Arab strength the Hagana command had to consider that they might go up against everything the Arabs had to offer in their war of liberation. Nobody really knows how many Arab soldiers actually fought in the war of 1948. Estimates range from 20,000 to 65,000 depending on the time period we are talking about. “The Hagana… could draw on a large reserve of Western trained and homegrown officers with military experience” (p. 181). Shlaim is talking about the 4000 or so soldiers that the British trained to fight at the end of World War II, known popularly as the Jewish Brigade and did see some action in Sicily. [4]
[1] Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2002, p. 15. Pollack lists the Egyptian heavy armor as a battalion of British made Mark VI and Matilda tanks, sixteen 25 pounder guns, a battery of eight 6-pounder guns, a medium machine gun battalion, more than thirty British made Spitfire fighter planes, and four Hawker Hurricane fighters with twenty American C-47 transports which mechanics had made into crude bombers. The Israelis on the other hand had fewer than 900 light mortars, 85 antitank weapons, five “ancient” artillery pieces and four tanks. The Egyptians alone held a huge military advantage over the Jews in this area.
[2] United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (in two parts),FRUS. Vol VI, p. 605
[3] FRUS Vol. VI p. 627.
[4] Refer to note 9
There is the incident of Israel shooting down five British fighters at the beginning of 1949. On January 1, 1949, Egyptian war ships appeared off the coast of Tel Aviv, and fired on the city. On January 2, 1949 an enemy plane, presumably Egyptian dropped three bombs over Jewish Jerusalem. As a result Jewish forces launched a retaliatory raid on El Arish which was the Egyptian staging point for all military operations inside Palestine. The British used the incursion into the Sinai as a pretext to invoke a 1936 agreement in which they were obligated to defend Egypt in case of invasion. Ben Gurion was warned by the British and promptly ordered all Jewish forces removed back behind Israeli lines. By January 3, 1949, all Israeli forces had been removed from Egyptian soil [2] On January 7, Israel shot down five British flown spitfires, killing at least one pilot and taking another prisoner because their aircraft crashed inside Israeli lines. [3]
I agree with Shlaim’s analysis of the Jewish side that he offers in this section.
The heroism of the Jewish fighters is not in question, nor is there any doubt about the heavy price that the Yishuv paid for its victory. Altogether there were 6,000 dead, 4,000 soldiers and 2,000 civilians, or about 1 percent of the entire population…It is true that the Yishuv numbered merely 650,000 souls, compared with 1.2 million Palestinian Arabs and nearly 40 million Arabs in the surrounding states. It is true that the senior military advisors told the Political leadership on 12 May 1948 that the Hagana had only a “fifty-fifty” chance of withstanding the imminent Arab attack. It is true that the sense of weakness and vulnerability in the Jewish population was as acute as it was pervasive and that some segments of this population were gripped by a feeling of gloom and doom. And, it is true that during the three critical weeks, from the invasion of Palestine by the regular armies of the Arab states on 15 May until the start of the first truce on 11 June, this community had to struggle for its very survival.
It would be hard not to acknowledge the above truisms about the ’48 war since these are all established facts but, Shlaim sticks one sentence in this paragraph almost as if he were trying to sneak it in. Right after the ellipses of the above quote, Shlaim says “ Nevertheless, the Yishuv was not as hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned as the official history would have us believe.” I would argue this as hyperbole.
Military generals always think in terms of the other side’s strengths and weaknesses. It is not for them to speculate on how the enemy might utilize those strengths and weaknesses only that they possess the potential for using it. In assessing Arab strength the Hagana command had to consider that they might go up against everything the Arabs had to offer in their war of liberation. Nobody really knows how many Arab soldiers actually fought in the war of 1948. Estimates range from 20,000 to 65,000 depending on the time period we are talking about. “The Hagana… could draw on a large reserve of Western trained and homegrown officers with military experience” (p. 181). Shlaim is talking about the 4000 or so soldiers that the British trained to fight at the end of World War II, known popularly as the Jewish Brigade and did see some action in Sicily. [4]
[1] Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2002, p. 15. Pollack lists the Egyptian heavy armor as a battalion of British made Mark VI and Matilda tanks, sixteen 25 pounder guns, a battery of eight 6-pounder guns, a medium machine gun battalion, more than thirty British made Spitfire fighter planes, and four Hawker Hurricane fighters with twenty American C-47 transports which mechanics had made into crude bombers. The Israelis on the other hand had fewer than 900 light mortars, 85 antitank weapons, five “ancient” artillery pieces and four tanks. The Egyptians alone held a huge military advantage over the Jews in this area.
[2] United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (in two parts),FRUS. Vol VI, p. 605
[3] FRUS Vol. VI p. 627.
[4] Refer to note 9
Schlaim critique: first bone of contention: British policy at the end of the mandate, Pt 2
Between November 29, 1947 and May 14, 1948 Shlaim contends that traditional Zionist historiography’s “central charge is that Britain armed and secretly encouraged her Arab allies” p.179. Shlaim credits others like Ilan Pappe with “Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict” along with his own “Collusion across the Jordan” to smash this particular myth.
Actually the official records of State in both Great Britain and the United States show an England having a very hard time cutting loose the apron strings that held British imperial territory in the Middle East together for the previous half century. The record clearly shows that while there might have been some well founded trepidation on the part of the Yishuv of British motives, the fears of Jewish expansionism seems to have dominated British thinking during this time almost as much as the possibility of Soviet involvement which both England and the U.S. were loathe to accept. Shlaim’s thesis, minus the Marxist inspired psycho-babble, in “Collusion” was probably well founded. The Jews were not fools. If they could increase their chances of survival by eliminating a major military player like Abdullah, then they would do it. This is what drove Ernest Bevin, Britain’s foreign secretary, and the architect of British involvement, especially with Abdullah during that time, to push for a greater Transjordan. This in turn probably pushed the Yishuv into this victim mentality and led to a mistrust of Transjordan’s motives for an agreement. However, Shlaim rejects any notion that England supported the Arab side even though early British apologies allude to that fact. For example, Glubb discusses a meeting with Bevin where the secretary states categorically that he “did everything he could to help (the Arabs) them. [1]
Although Shlaim does not like to admit it, British interests in 1948 were in fact very much with the Arabs and not with the Jews. While there is no evidence to show that the British tried to stop the Jewish state from coming into existence after the UN partition vote on November 29th , one can build a very strong case that the British did financially, militarily, and politically helped the Arabs, and although unsuccessful, this was designed to protect British interests which were perceived to be in direct conflict with nascent Israeli interests.
Bevin insisted that Abdullah’s legion not take their war into Jewish territory, as Shlaim asserts. But British soldiers fought with and commanded the legion during their entire campaign of 1948. For all intents and purposes the Jordanian legion commanded by John Bagot Glubb was a proxy British force in the Middle East and for that reason the evidence shows that Bevin was extremely concerned for its existence and the only thing preventing the Jews from infringing onto British interests in the area according to Bevin’s thinking. The rank and file of the Legion were mostly Arabs, but the officers were British. Some were actually seconded from the British army into the legion. These men were not withdrawn from Legion duties until after May 14, 1948. [2] Weapons were still being delivered to Transjordan as late as May 28th of that year. [3] The English subverted U.N. restrictions which drew consternation against Israel for violating, by insisting that they were only fulfilling commitments made prior to the United Nations embargo to arm the Middle East. [4]
Shlaim relates the Februray 7, 1948 meeting between Abdul Huda, Transjordan’s prime minister, and Secretary Bevin which gave the green light to the legion to move into the Palestinian allotted areas and secure the land for the Kingdom. This in effect wiped out any chance for an Arab state in Palestine and created what Bevin had labeled a “Greater Transjordan.”
“Bevin also warned Jordan not to invade the area allocated by the U.N. to the Jews” p. 179. This shows according to Shlaim that Britain supported the idea of a Jewish State while not supporting the idea of an Arab state. What Shlaim does not tell us is that it would have been tantamount to diplomatic suicide for the British to circumvent the U.N. decision to create a Jewish state in Palestine given its tense relations over the issue with the U.S. position in respect to U.S. public opinion. England certainly did not see the creation of a Jewish State as satisfying British interests in the area and might very well have prevented a Jewish state from coming into existence had the U.S. not been so adamant to allow international law to take its course.
The British also used their forces in a failed attempt to take back Jaffa after Arab forces had been defeated by Menachem Begin’s IZL. Like Jerusalem, Tel Aviv was suffering casualties on a daily basis because of the sniping coming from Arab Jaffa. The IZL claimed that the British had colluded with the Arabs to create a corridor from Jaffa to Jerusalem to cut the proposed Jewish State in two and thereby seal its fate. Therefore, the Haganna agreed to allow the Urgun to take the city. [5] In the ceasefire agreement, between the British and Jewish forces, they both backed off to neutral areas with a no man’s land in between and faced each other down until the British left Palestine on May 14th.. The British involvement in Jaffa was a direct order coming from HMG.
[1] John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, p. 180
[2] United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (in two parts), (FRUS) Volume V, Part 2 (1948), p. 1066.
[3] FRUS, Vol. V, part 2 page 1071. In this report from Lovett he mentions that Britain is supplying weapons to Egypt, Iraq as well as British proxy military force in the Middle East, the Jordanian Legion.
[4] FRUS, Vol. V, part 2, Note 4 page 563
[5] H.Boyer Bell, Terror out of Zion, London: New Brunswick Publishers, 1996, p. 302. I should point out that Boyer Bell’s sources for these accounts rely heavily on personal memoirs and interviews with participants from all sides. There is an index in the back of personal interviews and notes on the memoirs. This is what Shlaim is arguing in this piece which he claims is not valid history writing. For more on this and a Jewish view on Jaffa see, Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, New York: Vintage Books, 1982, p.36.
Actually the official records of State in both Great Britain and the United States show an England having a very hard time cutting loose the apron strings that held British imperial territory in the Middle East together for the previous half century. The record clearly shows that while there might have been some well founded trepidation on the part of the Yishuv of British motives, the fears of Jewish expansionism seems to have dominated British thinking during this time almost as much as the possibility of Soviet involvement which both England and the U.S. were loathe to accept. Shlaim’s thesis, minus the Marxist inspired psycho-babble, in “Collusion” was probably well founded. The Jews were not fools. If they could increase their chances of survival by eliminating a major military player like Abdullah, then they would do it. This is what drove Ernest Bevin, Britain’s foreign secretary, and the architect of British involvement, especially with Abdullah during that time, to push for a greater Transjordan. This in turn probably pushed the Yishuv into this victim mentality and led to a mistrust of Transjordan’s motives for an agreement. However, Shlaim rejects any notion that England supported the Arab side even though early British apologies allude to that fact. For example, Glubb discusses a meeting with Bevin where the secretary states categorically that he “did everything he could to help (the Arabs) them. [1]
Although Shlaim does not like to admit it, British interests in 1948 were in fact very much with the Arabs and not with the Jews. While there is no evidence to show that the British tried to stop the Jewish state from coming into existence after the UN partition vote on November 29th , one can build a very strong case that the British did financially, militarily, and politically helped the Arabs, and although unsuccessful, this was designed to protect British interests which were perceived to be in direct conflict with nascent Israeli interests.
Bevin insisted that Abdullah’s legion not take their war into Jewish territory, as Shlaim asserts. But British soldiers fought with and commanded the legion during their entire campaign of 1948. For all intents and purposes the Jordanian legion commanded by John Bagot Glubb was a proxy British force in the Middle East and for that reason the evidence shows that Bevin was extremely concerned for its existence and the only thing preventing the Jews from infringing onto British interests in the area according to Bevin’s thinking. The rank and file of the Legion were mostly Arabs, but the officers were British. Some were actually seconded from the British army into the legion. These men were not withdrawn from Legion duties until after May 14, 1948. [2] Weapons were still being delivered to Transjordan as late as May 28th of that year. [3] The English subverted U.N. restrictions which drew consternation against Israel for violating, by insisting that they were only fulfilling commitments made prior to the United Nations embargo to arm the Middle East. [4]
Shlaim relates the Februray 7, 1948 meeting between Abdul Huda, Transjordan’s prime minister, and Secretary Bevin which gave the green light to the legion to move into the Palestinian allotted areas and secure the land for the Kingdom. This in effect wiped out any chance for an Arab state in Palestine and created what Bevin had labeled a “Greater Transjordan.”
“Bevin also warned Jordan not to invade the area allocated by the U.N. to the Jews” p. 179. This shows according to Shlaim that Britain supported the idea of a Jewish State while not supporting the idea of an Arab state. What Shlaim does not tell us is that it would have been tantamount to diplomatic suicide for the British to circumvent the U.N. decision to create a Jewish state in Palestine given its tense relations over the issue with the U.S. position in respect to U.S. public opinion. England certainly did not see the creation of a Jewish State as satisfying British interests in the area and might very well have prevented a Jewish state from coming into existence had the U.S. not been so adamant to allow international law to take its course.
The British also used their forces in a failed attempt to take back Jaffa after Arab forces had been defeated by Menachem Begin’s IZL. Like Jerusalem, Tel Aviv was suffering casualties on a daily basis because of the sniping coming from Arab Jaffa. The IZL claimed that the British had colluded with the Arabs to create a corridor from Jaffa to Jerusalem to cut the proposed Jewish State in two and thereby seal its fate. Therefore, the Haganna agreed to allow the Urgun to take the city. [5] In the ceasefire agreement, between the British and Jewish forces, they both backed off to neutral areas with a no man’s land in between and faced each other down until the British left Palestine on May 14th.. The British involvement in Jaffa was a direct order coming from HMG.
[1] John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, p. 180
[2] United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (in two parts), (FRUS) Volume V, Part 2 (1948), p. 1066.
[3] FRUS, Vol. V, part 2 page 1071. In this report from Lovett he mentions that Britain is supplying weapons to Egypt, Iraq as well as British proxy military force in the Middle East, the Jordanian Legion.
[4] FRUS, Vol. V, part 2, Note 4 page 563
[5] H.Boyer Bell, Terror out of Zion, London: New Brunswick Publishers, 1996, p. 302. I should point out that Boyer Bell’s sources for these accounts rely heavily on personal memoirs and interviews with participants from all sides. There is an index in the back of personal interviews and notes on the memoirs. This is what Shlaim is arguing in this piece which he claims is not valid history writing. For more on this and a Jewish view on Jaffa see, Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, New York: Vintage Books, 1982, p.36.
Sunday, July 25, 2010
Saturday, July 24, 2010
A critique on Avi shlaim's "the debate about 1948" Part 1
The following is a critique of Avi Shlaim’s Historiography of the 1948 war, “The Debate About 1948” first published in The International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No.3, (August 1995) p. 287-304 and more recently in “The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting histories, edited by Ilan Pappe, Routledge, 1999, which this article uses as its reference.
After spending some time outlining what he calls the “old” history and briefly summarizing the litany of 80s publications exposing Israeli myths and counter myths about the country’s hallowed beginnings, he cites six “bones of contention” that traditional and “New Historian” researchers fundamentally disagree on. They are (1)“Britain’s policy at the end of the mandate, (2) The Arab-Israeli military balance in 1948, (3) the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, (4) the nature of the Israeli-Jordanian relations during the war, (5) Arab war aims, and(6) the reasons for the continuing political deadlock after the guns fell silent.
It is these bones of contention Shlaim concludes that divide the world of Zionist historiography into those that know and those that think they know. Why Shlaim chose those particular six is curious. As “bones of contention” many more issues can be debated than what is listed here. How about Israel’s settlement policy, it’s claim to water in the Levant’s tributaries, racist policies against Palestinian Israeli citizens, the claim to Jerusalem and all the conflict that has caused over the decades, and Jewish interests in general colliding with Palestinian interests. In a conflict this old, brewing with hatreds and long time scores not settled there are too many “bones of contention” to settle on only six. One has only to take his pick, and that is what it seems that Avi Shlaim has done in “The Debate.”
While admitting indirectly to such playful managing of the historical evidence (p. 174*) he concludes that earlier historians were not qualified to write the history of the 1948 war because “Most of the voluminous literature on the war was written not by professional historians but by participants, by politicians, soldiers, official historians, and a large host of sympathetic chroniclers, journalists, biographers, and hagiographers” and should therefore be rejected. (P. 173). There is good reason for Dr. Shlaim to reject this kind of evidence which will be argued throughout this piece because most of it is diametrically opposed to what Dr. Shlaim is promoting here.
It is interesting that Shlaim’s quote above about the Israeli favored histories on the war of 1948 is not too different from Avraham Sela’s description of the literature coming from the Arab side of that war in those first few years after the establishment of the State of Israel. The Arab history of 1948 according to Sela who revels in it, is almost exclusively the kind of history that Shlaim wants to reject. Sela describes it as a “large number of first-person accounts, textbooks, memoirs, diaries and polemics.” This can only suggest that most primary source material on both sides during that time came from these kinds of sources. Without it we would have almost no history at all. Does Shlaim suggest that we should disregard Walid Khalidi’s work on “The Fall of Haifa” or his “Documents of the ’48 Conflict” published in The Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 27, No.3,(Spring, 1998) p. 60-105? I doubt that even Shlaim’s admitted Marxist leanings (p. 189-190) would allow him to disregard such important historical information on the Arab perspective of 1948. It is precisely the Arab history of this time that Schlaim and others draw on to indict Israel’s founders of fabricating Israel’s early history. Could there be a double standard here?
Historical accounts after the war are “not history in the proper sense of the word.” P.172-173. I would argue against professor Shlaim’s assertion here. They are most certainly proper historical accounts, if for no other reason than they are the only sources of that war coming from that time period. That in itself makes them primary and vital to the historical record. Because they were decidedly Israeli or Arab centric, depending on the source you are reading, does not preclude that they are not valid. To reject any written material on any historical event even if it happened yesterday, simply because there are no official documents on which to draw the history, is absurd. The opening of Israeli political and military documents in the 1980s does not invalidate these sources, they only add another important dimension to the debate. Personal histories, eyewitness accounts or even partisan evaluations which lead to “sacred texts” of nations’ beginnings are every bit as important as released military documents in the 1980s.. Ben Gurion’s memoirs for example, offer a partisan view of the leader of Israel’s arguments and justifications for Israeli actions during the war. As the author, he has the inherent right to exclude or include any material that he wished. Is Ben Gurion’s point of view of no importance to the history? Under Shlaim’s present argument it would appear that it is.
Another avenue of history that often seems to be forgotten about this war is the British contribution. Shlaim is not the only historian guilty of this. This seems to follow the New Historian pattern of rewriting Israel’s beginning history. There were many British anti-Zionist apologies for the Arab disaster of 1948. However, they are rarely if ever referred to in modern historiographies on the war. And, that methodological tactic is present in this Shlaim piece. I can only assume that he does not because as an admitted leftist he is not comfortable with the motive of the British and its underlying imperialistic desires over the Middle East during that time, more than he is desiring to show sympathy with the underdog oppressed, persecuted Palestinians. E. O’Balance, Erskine Childers, John Baggot Glubb and others published a British view as to why the Arabs lost are all rejected by Shlaim as bonafied histories. Shlaim does see fit however, to quote A.J.P. Taylor a British Marxist who, unencumbered by Western capitalist influences, wrote a revisionism on the causes of World War II, and is remarkably similar to Shlaim’s thesis on “the Debate”.
No matter how much Avi Shlaim remains true to his Marxist ideology it does not give him license to rewrite history. It is the job of every historian to be as honest as they can otherwise the history they write will be meaningless. With that in mind Shlaim’s bones of contention might be valid but his perspective is suspect here. To me, a more accurate statement about these bones of contention are not so much between “old” and “new” historians, but between Marxist and the more traditional western style democratic influenced historians.
After spending some time outlining what he calls the “old” history and briefly summarizing the litany of 80s publications exposing Israeli myths and counter myths about the country’s hallowed beginnings, he cites six “bones of contention” that traditional and “New Historian” researchers fundamentally disagree on. They are (1)“Britain’s policy at the end of the mandate, (2) The Arab-Israeli military balance in 1948, (3) the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, (4) the nature of the Israeli-Jordanian relations during the war, (5) Arab war aims, and(6) the reasons for the continuing political deadlock after the guns fell silent.
It is these bones of contention Shlaim concludes that divide the world of Zionist historiography into those that know and those that think they know. Why Shlaim chose those particular six is curious. As “bones of contention” many more issues can be debated than what is listed here. How about Israel’s settlement policy, it’s claim to water in the Levant’s tributaries, racist policies against Palestinian Israeli citizens, the claim to Jerusalem and all the conflict that has caused over the decades, and Jewish interests in general colliding with Palestinian interests. In a conflict this old, brewing with hatreds and long time scores not settled there are too many “bones of contention” to settle on only six. One has only to take his pick, and that is what it seems that Avi Shlaim has done in “The Debate.”
While admitting indirectly to such playful managing of the historical evidence (p. 174*) he concludes that earlier historians were not qualified to write the history of the 1948 war because “Most of the voluminous literature on the war was written not by professional historians but by participants, by politicians, soldiers, official historians, and a large host of sympathetic chroniclers, journalists, biographers, and hagiographers” and should therefore be rejected. (P. 173). There is good reason for Dr. Shlaim to reject this kind of evidence which will be argued throughout this piece because most of it is diametrically opposed to what Dr. Shlaim is promoting here.
It is interesting that Shlaim’s quote above about the Israeli favored histories on the war of 1948 is not too different from Avraham Sela’s description of the literature coming from the Arab side of that war in those first few years after the establishment of the State of Israel. The Arab history of 1948 according to Sela who revels in it, is almost exclusively the kind of history that Shlaim wants to reject. Sela describes it as a “large number of first-person accounts, textbooks, memoirs, diaries and polemics.” This can only suggest that most primary source material on both sides during that time came from these kinds of sources. Without it we would have almost no history at all. Does Shlaim suggest that we should disregard Walid Khalidi’s work on “The Fall of Haifa” or his “Documents of the ’48 Conflict” published in The Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 27, No.3,(Spring, 1998) p. 60-105? I doubt that even Shlaim’s admitted Marxist leanings (p. 189-190) would allow him to disregard such important historical information on the Arab perspective of 1948. It is precisely the Arab history of this time that Schlaim and others draw on to indict Israel’s founders of fabricating Israel’s early history. Could there be a double standard here?
Historical accounts after the war are “not history in the proper sense of the word.” P.172-173. I would argue against professor Shlaim’s assertion here. They are most certainly proper historical accounts, if for no other reason than they are the only sources of that war coming from that time period. That in itself makes them primary and vital to the historical record. Because they were decidedly Israeli or Arab centric, depending on the source you are reading, does not preclude that they are not valid. To reject any written material on any historical event even if it happened yesterday, simply because there are no official documents on which to draw the history, is absurd. The opening of Israeli political and military documents in the 1980s does not invalidate these sources, they only add another important dimension to the debate. Personal histories, eyewitness accounts or even partisan evaluations which lead to “sacred texts” of nations’ beginnings are every bit as important as released military documents in the 1980s.. Ben Gurion’s memoirs for example, offer a partisan view of the leader of Israel’s arguments and justifications for Israeli actions during the war. As the author, he has the inherent right to exclude or include any material that he wished. Is Ben Gurion’s point of view of no importance to the history? Under Shlaim’s present argument it would appear that it is.
Another avenue of history that often seems to be forgotten about this war is the British contribution. Shlaim is not the only historian guilty of this. This seems to follow the New Historian pattern of rewriting Israel’s beginning history. There were many British anti-Zionist apologies for the Arab disaster of 1948. However, they are rarely if ever referred to in modern historiographies on the war. And, that methodological tactic is present in this Shlaim piece. I can only assume that he does not because as an admitted leftist he is not comfortable with the motive of the British and its underlying imperialistic desires over the Middle East during that time, more than he is desiring to show sympathy with the underdog oppressed, persecuted Palestinians. E. O’Balance, Erskine Childers, John Baggot Glubb and others published a British view as to why the Arabs lost are all rejected by Shlaim as bonafied histories. Shlaim does see fit however, to quote A.J.P. Taylor a British Marxist who, unencumbered by Western capitalist influences, wrote a revisionism on the causes of World War II, and is remarkably similar to Shlaim’s thesis on “the Debate”.
No matter how much Avi Shlaim remains true to his Marxist ideology it does not give him license to rewrite history. It is the job of every historian to be as honest as they can otherwise the history they write will be meaningless. With that in mind Shlaim’s bones of contention might be valid but his perspective is suspect here. To me, a more accurate statement about these bones of contention are not so much between “old” and “new” historians, but between Marxist and the more traditional western style democratic influenced historians.
Friday, July 23, 2010
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